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LEAD ARTICLE
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A POSITIVE LAW CONTEXT
Jianming Shen*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than one year has elapsed since the outbreak of the
Kosovo crisis and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. What
lessons have we learned from such crises in the areas of hu-
man rights and national sovereignty? What impact have they
had upon the international legal system?
At stake are impacts and lessons from not only the Kosovo
crisis, but also from a series of crises preceding and post-dating
Kosovo. Major conflicts and events in the last decade of the
20th century - from the Gulf War and its aftermath to atroci-
ties in Bosnia, from Rwanda to Somalia, and from Kosovo to
East Timor - have raised serious questions about humanity
and the foundational blocks of international law. These have
led to revived debates in the United Nations General Assembly
about the principle of national sovereignty and the prevention
of humanitarian disasters.' Ignorance of basic human rights
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formerly Kenneth Wang Research Professor of Law, St. John's University School of
Law; formerly Assistant Professor of International Law, Peking University Faculty
of Law. Copyright © 2000, Jianming Shen.
1. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. GA/9629, Questions Related to State Sover-
eignty and Role of Security Council in International Peacekeeping Addressed during
Assembly Discussion (Oct. 7, 1999), at http'/www.un.org(News/Press/docs/1999/1999-
1007.ga9629.doc.htm; Press Release, U.N. GA/9633, Importance of State Sovereignty,
Need to Address Human Rights Violations, Council Reform, Discussed in Assembly
(Oct. 8, 1999), at http'//www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/1999/19-991008.ga9633.doc.htm;
Press Release, U.N. GA19627, General Assembly Begins Discussion on Secretary-
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and dignity, particularly the rights of minority ethnic or reli-
gious groups, has been escalating. At the same time, abuses of
the concept of human rights per se, and intrusions into the
reserved areas of domestic jurisdiction of States, also have
been on the rise. NATO's aerial bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999,
without the United Nations Security Council's authorization,
represents the most complicated and forcible threat to the
existing international legal system. Quite a number of
statesmen and international lawyers, unsurprisingly yet un-
convincingly, have come to the defense of the NATO bombing
as if State sovereignty, the UN Charter, and fundamental prin-
ciples of international law were irrelevant. Yet, there are oth-
ers who have openly criticized the bombing and defended the
principle of national sovereignty.
In a recent essay of mine, I concurred with some2 that
NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia violated the jus
cogens principles of State sovereignty, non-intervention, and
non-use of force, as embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations and general international law. I specifically rejected
five major arguments that had been advanced to justify the
NATO bombing: collective self-defense, regional arrangements,
prevention of genocide, humanitarian intervention, and an
argument based on a narrow construction of Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter.4 Beyond question is the illegality of NATO's use
of force itself, not to mention the mode of its operation and the
detrimental consequences it caused. Judging against the lex
lata of international law, even some of those who somewhat
favored or fathomed the NATO operation admit that justifying
the bombing is not easy, even with the vainglorious notion of
humanitarian intervention.5
General's Annual Report on Work of Organization (Oct. 6, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991006.ga9627.doc.htm.
2. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal As-
pects, 10 [11 EUR. J. INT'L L. (1999), at http://www.ejil.orgljour-
nal/VollO/Nol/abl.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000); Antonio Cassese, Comment Ex
iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 [1] EUR. J. INT'L L.
(1999), at http://www.ejil.org/journal/VolI0/Nol/com.htm; Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO
and International Law (May 17, 1999), at http'//jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.htm.
3. Jianming Shen, Intervention, Use of Force and NATO's War Against Yugo-
slavia (September 1999) Part A [hereinafter Shen, Intervention] (on file with the
author).
4. Id. at Part B.
5. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 2; Cassese, supra note 2. See also Kai Am-
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Harder to address are the following questions: How impor-
tant are human rights vis-&-vis States' sovereign rights or vice
versa? Does the stress on one category of rights have to result
in the negation of the other? As the new millennium is upon
us, how should the international community balance national
sovereignty with individual rights? Is it ready to replace the
nation-States with a "world government" or global governance?
Is it time to change existing international law? In what direc-
tion? Toward what aims? To what degree? By whom? Through
what? And how? This essay purports to supply hard answers to
these hard questions.
II. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AS THE FOUNDATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nation-States have been the foundation blocks of the in-
ternational legal system since the birth of international law in
modern time.6 In the exercise of their national sovereignty,
States created international law. The validity and effectiveness
of international law depends on the continuing consent and
support of nation-States, while the protection of national sover-
eignty and independence is contingent upon an effective inter-
national legal system that is founded upon nation-States.7 In
contemporary conditions, neither States nor international law
can exist without the other.8
At the outset, the principle of State sovereignty and its
corollaries must be understood in a broader context and with
reference to one another. They cannot be cut down to pieces
and treated in complete isolation. The corollaries of the princi-
ple of State sovereignty include, but are not limited to, the
following: (1) sovereign equality; (2) political independence; (3)
territorial integrity; (4) exclusive jurisdiction over a territory
and the permanent population therein; (5) freedom from exter-
nal intervention and the corresponding duty of non-interven-
bos, Comment on: Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal As-
pects, 10 [1) EUR. J. INTL L. (1999), at http//www.ejil.orgjour-
nal/VollO/Nollcoma.htm.
6. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTL LAW 305 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)
(stating that there is no doubt with respect to the prohibition of intervention by
international law).
7. See id.
8. See id.
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tion in areas of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of other States;
(6) freedom to choose political, economic, social and cultural
systems; and, (7) dependence of obligations arising from inter-
national law and treaties on the consent of States.9
Of particular importance among these corollaries is the
prohibition of interference and intervention. The principle of
State sovereignty and sovereign equality inherently requires
that a State refrain from interference in the internal or exter-
nal affairs of another State. 0 As Oppenheim stated, the non-
intervention principle grounds itself in the principle of State
sovereignty." It is, using the words of two authors, a corollary
of "the rule of the independence of states," i.e., the rule of sov-
ereign equality. 2 Non-intervention by States in each other's
domestic affairs is one of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence" (known as Heping Gongchu Wuxiang Yuanze in
Chinese and Pancha Shila in Hindis) jointly espoused by Chi-
na, India and Burma." It is also the position of the United
States that "the right of a state to exist as a juridical person in
the international community imposes the correlative duty of
non-intervention in both the internal and external affairs of
another state."'4
State sovereignty is the very foundation upon which inter-
national law exists. State sovereignty and its corollaries were
recognized among the European Nation-States as a fundamen-
tal principle from "Day One" when international law came into
being. Bodin's proposition that States had absolute, indivisible
and perpetual sovereignty" was reflective of the practical
need to "promot[e] peace by validating the power of the French
king against rival claimants." 6 Grotius and his followers,
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IM-
PORT IN THE AMERICAS xi (1956).
13. The five principles are: (1) Mutual respect of each other's sovereignty and
territorial integrity; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each
other's domestic affairs; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful co-exis-
tence. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-62 (Wang Tieya, ed., Law Publishing House
1995); MU YAPING ET AL., A TREATISE ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 72-
77 (Law Publishing House 1998).
14. M. WHITEMAN, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1965).
15. See JEAN BODIN, Six LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 1.8-11.5 (1586).
16. Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial
420 [Vol. XXVI:2
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drawing on works of earlier writers, likewise "presupposed a
territorial order in which states were free from outside con-
trol."17 Vattel fully recorded the principle of sovereign inde-
pendence and equality of states in his influential works. 8
From the principle of territorial sovereignty, Vattel derived the
proposition that ownership of a territory entitles a State to
exercise jurisdiction. 9 For him, all States were equal, with
the same rights and obligations, and the actual might of States
did not matter; "a small republic is no less a sovereign state
than the most powerful kingdom."" He argued that no State
had the right to intervene in another State's government, stat-
ing that "sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious [right of a
nation] ... which other nations ought most scrupulously to re-
spect."2' The opinions of these renowned writers were insepa-
rable from the practical need of Nation-States to be treated by
each other as equals.
The Peace of Westphalia was the first formal step toward
the formation of a nation-State system and nation-States' re-
spective recognition of each other's sovereignty. The principle
of State sovereignty or its corollary was repeatedly emphasized
in the practice of States as witnessed in the 1776 American
Declaration of Independence,22 the 1778 Franco-American
Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Amity and Commerce,' 3 the
1789 French Ddclaration des droit de l'homme et du citoyen,'4
Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SO-
CIAL CONSTRUCT 81, 85 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, eds., Cambridge
1996).
17. Id. at 85, n.20, citing ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (Routledge 1992). For Grotius'
reference to state sovereignty, see HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE
28-44 (Francis H. Kelsey trans., 1925).
18. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVER-
EIGNS, Preliminaries, § 4 (C. Fenwick trans., 1916).
19. See id. at vol. 6, § 84.
20. Id. at Preliminaries, § 18.
21. Id. at II.vi.54.
22. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
23. See Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 6; Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 12.
24. See DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (1789),
translated in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 71 (1985), art. 3 (identifying sovereign-
ty with the State by proclaiming, "The source of all sovereignty lies essentially in
the Nation. No corporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does
not expressly emanate from it.").
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the 1795 French draft Dgclaration du droit des gens,' the
Russian Decree of Peace of 8 November 1917, the Declaration
of the Rights of Nations of Russia of 15 November 1917,26 and
the 1938 Declaration of Lima concerning the principles govern-
ing American States." In short, the principle of national sov-
ereignty has been firmly affirmed and reaffirmed in modern 2
and post-modern international practice and instruments.
The League of Nations Covenant solemnly declared that
its members "undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing politi-
cal independence of all Members of the League."2' Although
disputes between League Members were to be submitted to
judicial or arbitral organs for legal settlement, or to the Coun-
cil for advice, it was made clear that where "the dispute [was].
. . claimed ... and.., found... to arise out of a matter which
by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction
of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no
recommendation as to its settlement."29 The Montevideo Con-
vention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 provided that
all States "are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and
have equal capacity in their exercise," that "[n]o State has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of anoth-
er," and that States have "the precise obligation not to recog-
nize . . . special advantages which have been obtained by
force." 0 The 1975 Helsinki Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations Between Participating States declared the "primary
significance" of the principles of, inter alia, (1) sovereign equal-
ity, (2) no-threat or use of force, (3) the inviolability of fron-
tiers, (4) territorial integrity, (5) peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, and (6) non-intervention in internal affairs.31
25. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 118-
119 (1954).
26. See RUSSIAN DECREE OF PEACE, Nov. 8, 1917; DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF NATIONS OF RUSSIA, Nov. 15, 1917. See also A HISTORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 296-298 (Wang Shengzu et al., eds., Law Publishing House
1986).
27. Declaration of Lima, Dec. 24, 1938, para. 1, reprinted in, 3 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1176-1949
534 (Bevans, ed. 1968).
28. LEAGuE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.
29. Id. at art. 15, para. 8.
30. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 28, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097,
T.S. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, arts. 4, 8, 11.
31. Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States,
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The principle of State sovereignty and its corollaries are
not only reiterated but also strengthened in the UN Charter.
The establishment of the United Nations "is based on the prin-
ciple of the sovereign equality of all its Members."32 The
Charter makes the use of force against the sovereignty of an-
other State illegal by providing that member States must "re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."33 It further provides that
nothing in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to sub-
mit such matters to settlement under the ... Charter" except
for "the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. , ,34
The General Assembly has reaffirmed the principle of
State sovereignty in a series of resolutions. Resolution 2131
(XX) (1965) declares that "[n]o state has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal
and external affairs of any other state."35 Resolution 2625
(XXV) (1970) elaborates the principle of State sovereignty by
providing:
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights
and duties and are equal members of the international com-
munity, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social
political or other nature.
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following ele-
ments:
(a) States are juridically equal;
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other
States;
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the
State are inviolable;
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its
Principles I-VI, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Declaration].
32. UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
33. Id. at art. 2(4).
34. Id. at art. 2(7).
35. G.A. Res. 2131/XX, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11.
20001
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political, social, economic and cultural systems;
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith
with its international obligations and to live in peace with
other States.
The same resolution also particularizes two close corollaries of
State sovereignty: the principles of non-use of force and non-
intervention. The threat, or actual use, of force against the
territorial integrity and political independence of another state
is declared to be a "violation of international law and the Char-
ter of the United Nations" and can never be employed as a
means for the settlement of international issues." The resolu-
tion specifically declares aggression to be "a crime against the
peace" for which there would be international criminal respon-
sibility."8 It further condemns armed or any other forms of
interventions in the internal or external affairs of another
State or against its personality or its political, economic and
cultural elements, and declares them to be also a "Violation of
international law." 9
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) renders a detailed defini-
tion of aggression, declaring as aggression, inter alia, "the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations."'
In Resolution 36/103 (1981), the General Assembly stress-
es that "full observance of the principles of non-intervention
and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of
sovereign States . . . is essential to the fulfillment of the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."41
36. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, A/RES/2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, ("The principle of
sovereign equality of States.").
37. Id. at para. 1, ("Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of
force . . . "). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
38. Id. at para. 2.
39. Id. at para. 1 ("The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in
matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.").
40. Definition of Aggression, A/RES/3314 (XXIX), Dec. 14, 1974, Annex, art. 1.
41. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intrusion and Interference in the
Internal Affairs of States, Annex to G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 91st
plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (1981).
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The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention con-
tained therein reaffirms, inter alia, (1) that no State has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of any
other State; (2) that "all States have the duty not to threaten
or use force against the sovereignty, political independence or
territorial integrity of other States"; (3) that the maintenance
and strengthening of international peace and security must be
"founded upon freedom, equality, self-determination and inde-
pendence, respect for the sovereignty of States"; and (4) that
full observance of the principle of non-intervention "is of the
greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace
and security" as well as for fulfilling the principles of the UN
Charter.42 Under the same Declaration, the principle of non-
intervention in the first place comprises, inter alia, the rights
of "[s]overeignty, political independence, territorial integrity,
national unity and security of all States."43 The principle also
comprehends the duty of a State to refrain from, inter alia:
a. Promoting, encouraging or supporting "rebellious or
secessionist activities within other States, under any pretext
whatsoever, or any action which seeks to disrupt the unity or
to undermine or subvert the political order of other States";
44
b. Concluding agreements with another State or States
"designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external
affairs of third States";45
c. "Any measure which would lead to the strengthening of
existing military blocs or the creation or strengthening of new
military alliances, interlocking arrangements, the deployment
of interventionist forces or military bases and other related
military installations";46 and,
d. Exploiting and distorting "human rights issues as a
means of interference in the internal affairs of States, of exert
42. Id.
43. Id. at para. 2(I)(a).
44. Id. at para. 2(I)(f).
45. Id. at para. 2(II)(h).
46. Id. at para. 2(II)(i).
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ing pressure on other States or creating distrust and disorder
within and among States or groups of States.""
Numerous other General Assembly resolutions and docu-
ments have repeatedly stressed the importance of the princi-
ples of State sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of
force. For example, Resolution 40/158 (1985) urges "all States
to abide strictly... by their commitment to the Charter of the
United Nations," including their commitment "[t]o refrain from
the use or threat of use of force, intervention, interference,
aggression, foreign occupation and colonial domination or mea-
sures of political and economic coercion which violate the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, independence and security of
other States."48 Resolution 45/151 (1990), concerning "respect
for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference,"
urges all States to respect the principle of "non-interference in
the internal affairs of States and the sovereign right of peoples
to determine their political, economic and social system."49 It
condemns "any act of armed aggression or threat or use of
force," 0 and requests the Commission on Human Rights to
review "the fundamental factors that negatively affect the
observance of the principle of national sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States."51 Resolution
50/6 carrying the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the United Nations (1995) emphasizes that
"[t]he continued promotion and development of international
law must be pursued with a view to ensuring that relations be-
tween States are based on the principles of justice, sovereign
equality, universally recognized principles of international law
and respect for the rule of law."52 Resolution 50/172 (1996)
47. Declaration on the Inadmissibilty of Intervention, supra note 40, at para.
2(II)(1).
48. Review of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security, G.A. Res. 158, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/40/158 para. 2(a) (1985).
49. Respect for the Principles of Nat'l Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the
Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151 (1990).
50. Id. at para. 6.
51. Id. at para. 9.
52. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 6, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6, (1995), sec.
Justice, para. 1. See also id. at sec. Peace, para. 4 (referring to the inviolability of
the political independence and territorial integrity of sovereign States).
426 [Vol. XXVI:2
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reaffirms the principles of State sovereignty and non-interfer-
ence and condemns aggression and use of force in almost the
same wording53 as Resolution 45/151. Resolution 53/144
(1999) acknowledges the need to eliminate gross violations of
fundamental rights originating from, inter alia, "aggression or
threats to national sovereignty, national unity or territorial
integrity" of States.'4 Resolution 53/101 (1999) likewise reaf-
firms the "principles of international law" of sovereign equality
of all States, non-intervention, faithful observation of interna-
tional obligations, and non-use of force.5"
While the General Assembly does not possess the legisla-
tive power to pass binding resolutions, its importance in mani-
festing the general attitude of UN members cannot be underes-
timated; especially where the same principles have been re-
peatedly declared and reaffirmed. The various declarations and
resolutions mentioned above, together with relevant Charter
provisions and other treaty provisions, provide weighty evi-
dence that the principle of State sovereignty and its corollaries
are essential to the existence and proper functioning of the
United Nations and the entire system of international law as a
whole.
After all, international law is the product of practice,
agreements and compromises of nation-States. Since nation-
States emerged, no State has ever existed alone in a vacuum.
Rather, it is inevitable that each State must to one degree or
another enter into relations with other members of the inter-
national society. Such relations are determined by the State's
national will. Sovereignty and other fundamental rights of the
State are the requirements and expressions of the will of the
State, while the corresponding obligations to respect the sover-
eignty and other fundamental rights of other States are the
53. See Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interfer-
ence in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 172,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 99th plen. mtg., preamble, and paras. 4 & 6, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/50/172 (1996).
54. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 85th plen.
mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144 (1999), preamble.
55. Principles and Guidelines for International Negotiations, G.A. Res. 101,
U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., para. 1(a), (b), U.N. Doc. A/Res/53/101
(1999).
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result of the State's compromise in its national will in ex-
change for certain benefits, including other States' respect for
its own sovereignty and other fundamental rights. That is how
a system of international law is agreed upon. It is the nation-
States that are simultaneously the law-makers, subjects, and
implementers of international law. The States create and
maintain a system of international law to regulate their rela-
tions with, and to undertake various obligations toward, one
another. Despite the many compromises they have had to or
will have to make, they continue to participate in and support
this system. This is because on the whole it is supposed to pro-
tect, and has in fact protected, their national sovereignty and
other rights associated with that sovereignty."
III. THE IMPORTANCE AND RELATIVITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
While the continuing foundational importance of national
sovereignty to the international system should not be underes-
timated, it is also important to recognize that State sovereign-
ty has never been absolute ever since the creation of interna-
tional law. Since international law evolves from the compro-
mised will and consent of States, such compromises or compro-
mised "will" and "consent" have necessarily placed certain
limits upon States' national sovereignty. In the field of human
rights, for example, to the extent that States have agreed to
some bilateral, multilateral or general norms by way of treaty
or custom, their national sovereignty will be subject to the
limitations placed upon them by such norms. One of the re-
strictions States have agreed to place upon their sovereignty is
that they, under the United Nations Charter, have given the
Security Council the power to intervene or permit intervention
where domestic or inter-State human rights situations are
found to constitute an act of aggression or a threat to or breach
of international peace.57
Nation-States came into existence by historical self-forma-
56. See Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe,
17 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 287-355 (1999); Jianming Shen, Theories on the Basis of In-
ternational Law, in PEACE, JUSTICE AND LAW: COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN COMMEM-
ORATION OF THE 80TH BIRTHDAY OF PROFESSOR WANG TiEYA 230-260 (Beijing:
China International Broadcasting Publishing House, 1993).
57. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
428 [Vol. XXVI:2
SOVEREIGNTY & HUMAN RIGHTS
tion, conquest, agreement or revolution. States have developed
international law to benefit their national interests, including
the interests of their subjects - individuals. The normal and
perhaps the most effective way to protect the interests and
rights of individuals within a particular nation-State was, until
recent decades, through its domestic legal system. Since the
establishment of the United Nations, human rights issues have
increasingly entered the domain of international law, inevita-
bly resulting in further limitations on the scope of national
sovereignty and jurisdiction.
At the time the UN Charter was adopted, the world-wide
need to solve social problems and to promote the respect and
protection of human rights was gaining importance; particu-
larly in view of the conditions that led to the Second World
War and the atrocities committed during it. One of the purpos-
es of the United Nations is to solve "international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character," and
to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion."58 The Preamble of the Charter has
indeed reaffirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small."59 Under the
Charter, the General Assembly is required to "initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of ... assisting in
the realization of human rights.""0 All Members of the United
Nations pledge "to take joint and separate action" in coopera-
tion with the United Nations for achieving the purposes speci-
fied in Article 55,6" one of which is to "promote . . .universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
and religion."62 The Economic and Social Council is autho-
rized to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all,"63 and is further charged with the task of
58. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
59. Id. at preamble, para. 2.
60. Id. at art. 13(1)(b).
61. Id. at art. 56.
62. Id. at art. 55(c).
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 62(2).
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setting up (and maintaining) commissions "for the promotion of
human rights."" Finally, the now-obsolete trusteeship system
under the Charter was also designed, inter alia, to "encourage
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all."
6 5
The commitment of the United Nations to the promotion
and protection of human rights is further reflected in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 6 the 1948 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 7 the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights6 and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.69
There are many other treaties and agreements dealing with
specific aspects or regional issues of human rights, within or
without the UN framework. The international community,
mainly through the United Nations and its organs, increasing-
ly has to address humanitarian catastrophes and other mas-
sive, flagrant and systematic violations of human rights. Os-
tensibly, the significance of world-wide human rights promo-
tion and protection and the effects of a growing international
human rights law on national sovereignty cannot be under-
rated. To a certain extent, States have voluntarily, or involun-
tarily by compromise, restricted part of their national sover-
eignty in the treatment of nationals and other individuals by
participating in various human-rights-related treaties and
practices.
Notwithstanding, the importance of human rights is a
matter of relativity. Before us is a world of various actors with
nation-States at its core. National rights and societal interests
still matter. Just as sovereignty is not absolute, nor are human
rights. Although some aspects of human rights, such as the
64. Id. at art. 68.
65. Id. at art. 76(c).
66. See G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
GA/RES/217/Annex (1948).
67. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
68. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter "Civil and Political
Rights Covenant"].
69. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan.
3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2(2), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (hereinafter
"Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant"].
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right to be free from genocide, slavery and torture, may be said
to be inflexible or nearly inflexible, most aspects of human
rights are inherently subject to some degree of limitation. The
exercise of individual rights may not interfere with the inter-
ests and rights of other individuals and those of the society as
a whole. "The state is . .. the entity accorded the obligation
under international law to represent the interests of all its
inhabitants..., [and] this responsibility is manifested in limi-
tations on human rights for the purpose of upholding funda-
mental general interests of society."" Under the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant, for instance, the freedom of expres-
sion may be subject, where necessary, to domestic law restric-
tions for the purpose of (1) respecting the rights or reputations
of others or (2) protecting national security, ordre public, or
public health or morals.7 ' Even the Convention against Tor-
ture contains some loopholes by allowing a contracting party to
make reservations with respect to certain provisions72 and
even to denounce the entire Convention.73 These limitations of
human rights illustrate that States' willingness and agreement
to participate in the international protection of individual
rights have not placed individual rights above national sover-
eignty and societal interests. The States remain the corner-
stone of international law, including international human
rights law, irrespective of whether one regards that law to be
perfect and effective or not.
The relativity of human rights is also evident in the pres-
ent status of human rights regimes in international law. The
relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter on human
rights merely require Members of the organization to cooperate
with one another for the promotion and respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms without laying out specific
rights of individuals and specific duties of States. 4 The im-
portance of realizing human rights notwithstanding, nothing in
70. Roy E. Thoman, The New World Order: Sovereignty, Human Rights and
the Self-Determination of Peoples, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 271, 271-272 (1997).
71. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 68, at art. 19(3).
72. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, GAIResI39/46/Annex (1984), art. 28(1) (respecting the competence of the U.N.
Committee against Torture) & art. 30(2).
73. See Id. at art. 31.
74. See U.N. CHARTER preamble and art. 1.
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the Charter suggests that human rights are higher than na-
tional sovereign rights. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, one has to admit, is not in itself law-making in inter-
national law. It is a non-binding and unenforceable instru-
ment75 although some of its provisions may have entered into
the realm of customary international law. The Declaration
simply establishes certain common goals and standards of
human rights protection which "all peoples and all nations"
should strive to achieve.76
The Genocide Convention does define genocide," but in
no sense was it designed to undermine the principle of State
sovereignty. In fact, the Convention's implementation relies
upon national measures of the parties. It requires the parties
to enact necessary legislation in order to give effect to its pro-
visions and, in particular, to effectively punish individuals who
commit genocide.7" The parties' obligation to extradite geno-
cide offenders is subject to their own municipal laws or trea-
ties.79 National courts still have primary jurisdiction and re-
sponsibility to punish those charged with genocide, who "shall
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of
which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Con-
tracting Parties which shall have accepted this jurisdiction.""
Although an international criminal court may be available for
the trial and punishment of genocidal crimes, the Convention
contains no requirement that a party submit to the jurisdiction
of such a court."1
75. On the effects of General Assembly resolutions and declarations, see
Jianming Shen, The Role of the United Nations in the Determination and Develop-
ment of International Law, CH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 13-44 (1996).
76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G-A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., Annex, para. 8, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), preamble.
77. See Genocide Convention, supra note 67, at art. 1.
78. See id. at art. 5.
79. See id. at art. 7.
80. Id. at art. 6.
81. See S. Res. 347 (giving the Senate's consent and advice to ratify the Geno-
cide Convention), 132 CONG. REC. 1378 (1986) (stating that "with regard to the
reference to an international penal tribunal in Article VI of the Convention, the
United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in any
such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that purpose with the
advice and consent of the Senate"). See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE at 108 (by Richard
432 [Vol. =XI2
SOVEREIGNTY & HUMAN RIGHTS
Similarly, the two International Covenants depend for
their effectiveness and implementation on the contracting
parties' enforcement measures, including in particular the
adoption of domestic legislation.82 The Covenants not only
recognize the jurisdiction, and therefore sovereignty of the
contracting parties,' but also allow the parties to retain the
sovereign right to subject some of the protected individual
rights to certain limitations imposed by their domestic law.
Thus, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant permits a con-
tracting party, for the purpose of public safety, health, morals
and order, or for protecting the fundamental rights of others,
to impose by national legislation such restrictions as necessary
on the freedom of movement within its territory,' the right to
manifest one's religion or beliefs,85 the right of expression,86
the right of peaceful assembly,87 and the right to freedom of
association." The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Cove-
nant likewise allows the parties to subject the protected rights
"to such limitations as are determined by law" if such limita-
tions are not incompatible with the nature of these rights and
are "solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in
a democratic society."89 In particular, national law may im-
pose restrictions on the right of individuals to form or join
trade unions," the right of trade unions to function freely,9
and the right to strike,92 restrictions on the exercise "by mem-
bers of the armed forces or of the police or of the administra-
tion of the State" of the right to form or join trade unions, the
right of trade unions to function independently and to form
federations or join international trade-union organizations. 3
G. Lugar, Chairman, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1985).
82. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 68, at art. 2(2); Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 2(1).
83. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 68, at art. 2(1); Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 14.
84. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 68, at art. 12(3).
85. See id. at art. 18(3).
86. See id. at art. 19(3).
87. See id. at art. 21.
88. See id. at art. 22(2).
89. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 4.
90. See id. at art. 8(1)(a).
91. See id. at art. 8(1)(c).
92. See id. at art. 8(1)(d).
93. Id. at art. 8(2).
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The importance and relativity of human rights indicate
that human rights issues can neither be overlooked and avoid-
ed, nor exaggerated and "abused." On one hand, massive and
flagrant violations of human rights, particularly of fundamen-
tal human rights, are no longer the exclusive concerns of do-
mestic jurisdiction. 4 Through relevant human rights enforce-
ment mechanisms established under treaties, the international
community at large has the right to hold the gross violators
answerable and responsible on the international plane. On the
other hand, the achievement of promotion and protection of
human rights must be made within the confines of positive law
principles and norms, including the principle of State sover-
eignty. Not every aspect of human rights issues is appropriate
for international action, and, more importantly, not every al-
leged human rights issue is really a human rights issue at all.
IV. HARMONIZING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
PosrrivE LAW
Respect for State sovereignty and protection of individual
rights are both essential to the existing international legal
system. Then, under current positive law, can human rights be
protected and enhanced without serious damage to State sover-
eignty? Do human rights take precedence over national sover-
eign rights in case of conflict? Or, can the principle of State
sovereignty be used as a veil to protect a State completely from
international responses to its gross violations of obligations
under positive human rights law?
The prevalent view in the West is that human rights viola-
tions provide legal and moral grounds for disregarding the
sovereign rights of States.95 Henkin, reluctant to use the word
"sovereignty," considers this concept as a mistake upon mis-
takes, stating that "'sovereignty' has been transmuted into an
94. See, e.g., In Re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139
(E.D.N.Y. 2000); In Re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp.
2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
95. See, e.g., Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No Longer
Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention, 6 ETHIcs & INTL AFF. 95 (1992);
Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 417 (1999).
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axiom of the inter-state system, which has become a barrier to
international governance, to the growth of international law,
and to the realization of human values."" Propositions such
as the one that "basic needs and human rights are .. .more
important than claims of inviolable national sovereignty"97 are
not unfamiliar. Indeed, to British Prime Minister Tony Blair
and his supporters, "some important aspects of the principle of
non-interference in internal affairs should be limited" because
"a country's sovereignty is not as important as human
rights.""8 Third world countries, on the other hand, tend to
stress the importance of the inviolability of national sovereign-
ty, political independence and territorial integrity while also
recognizing the need for international cooperation to address
problems of massive and systematic violations of human
rights. 
99
The extreme view that human rights are more important
than national sovereignty is contrary to the reality under posi-
tive law, and is in particular incompatible with the principles
of sovereign equality, non-intervention, and prohibitions on the
use of force. Despite the importance of international promotion
and protection of human rights, it would be misleading simply
to maintain preeminence of individual rights over national
sovereignty. These two categories of rights, though somewhat
contradictory to one another, do not have to be viewed as "ene-
mies" with one "conquering" the other. In my opinion, neither
should national sovereignty and the principle of non-interven-
tion be used as a shield behind which a State can act in wan-
ton and unrestrained disregard for its international obligations
96. Louis Henkin, Sibley Lecture, March 1994: Human Rights and State "Sov-
ereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, (1995/1996).
97. William B. Wood, Geography: A Lesson for Diplomats, 23 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 5, 14 (Fall 1999).
98. See China: Hegemony Doomed to Fail, CHINA DAILY, May 18, 1999, at 4,
available in 1999 WL 17779541 (criticizing the ideas of limited sovereignty and
preeminence of human rights over national sovereignty).
99. For the positions of some third world countries on sovereignty and human
rights, see, for example, Press Release, U.N. GA/9606, Questions of Sovereignty, the
State System, the Future of the Organization Raised by General Debate Speakers,
(Sept. 24, 1999) (including Singapore, Iraq, Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, and
Iran); Press Release, U.N. GA/9627, supra note 1 (including Colombia, Kuwait,
Mongolia, China, Bangladesh, India, Venezuela); Press Release, U.N. GA/9633,
supra note 1 (including Cuba, Algeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,
Senegal, and Sudan).
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relating to fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals or
groups of people, nor should the need for respect and protec-
tion of human rights be used and indeed abused to disrespect
and undermine the sovereignty, inviolability and dignity of
States. Instead, the relationship between national sovereignty
and individual rights should and can be complementary. When
one deals with the legal relationship between national sover-
eignty and human rights, both categories of rights should be
viewed in the context of positive international law rather than
from perspectives of value, religion, culture and ideology.
The fundamental interests of a State do not necessarily
contradict with those of its citizens. The preservation of and
respect for State sovereignty can, in fact, better realize and
protect the fundamental interests and rights of individuals
within the domestic legal order. A jungle-like international
system under which one State could freely interfere with the
affairs of another in the name of human rights protection
would tend to result in the very denial of the fundamental
interests and rights of weaker States and their people. As Qin
Huasun, the former Chinese Ambassador to the United Na-
tions points out, sovereignty is the last "defense screen" of
small and weak countries against foreign bullying, and there
would be no peace if that screen were broken.1"0
In the modern history of China, western powers inter-
vened in China's internal and external affairs time and again,
not infrequently on "humanitarian" grounds. As part of the
consequences of such interventions, China lost much of its
territory to Russia, ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain, trans-
ferred Taiwan to Japan, relinquished its control or influence
over outer Mongolia, Korea, Indochina and Burma.0 1
Additonally, most of the remaining Chinese territory was di-
vided into Spheres of Influence of the British, French, German,
Japanese, Russian and the like. The lack of basic human
rights largely due to the insecurity of national sovereignty can
be seen from the fact that, until the middle of the 20th centu-
ry, the Chinese people were in essence deprived of their com-
plete sovereign rights to run their own country, to engage in
100. See Press Release, U.N. GA/9627, supra note 1.
101. See Wang Tieya, China and International Law - Historical and Contempo-
rary, CH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 5-115, 34-35 (1991).
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their economic development, and to lead their way of life free
from foreign interference. In concessions "granted" under du-
ress by the Chinese government to foreign powers, the Chinese
people suffered significant indignities in violation of putative
human rights concepts allegedly adhered to by such powers.
Under a series of unequal treaties recognizing the "extraterri-
torial jurisdiction" of foreign powers, where the interests and
rights of foreigners were offended by Chinese citizens, the
Chinese authorities were required to "arrest and punish" the
offenders (because of harsher punishment under the Chinese
criminal system); where the interests and rights of the Chinese
were offended by a foreigner, he or she would be subject to the
exclusive consular jurisdiction of his or her own country and to
a penalty, if any, to be determined under its own law." 2 His-
tory has proven that if a State cannot enjoy the inviolability of
its sovereignty, its ability to protect its people and to promote
their interests, "rights" and welfare will be greatly impaired.
Effective promotion and protection of human rights must
thus be founded upon respect for the inviolability of States' na-
tional sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integ-
rity. We do not need to and should not view States with hostil-
ity. They and their governments are not necessarily rights
deniers as sometimes perceived. Rather, they are generally the
best promoters and protectors of the rights and interests of
their nationals. Generally speaking, it is the States that truly
care about their own people more than any other government
or organization. Most States are reasonable and ready to coop-
erate with one another in carrying out their obligations under
positive international law in the field of human rights. As the
Colombian representative to the UN observes, States "would be
interested and willing to participate in the prevention of crises,
as well as in their solution."' A peacefully coexistent and
virtually non-interventionist international community would
work better toward reducing ethnic, cultural, religious and
even ideological distrust, hatred and conflicts, and therefore
curtailing chances of massive and systematic violations of
fundamental human rights and freedoms. On the contrary,
disrespect for a State's sovereignty, political independence, and
102. Id. at 42.
103. Press Release, U.N. GA/9627, supra note 1.
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territorial integrity would not only affect its general ability to
protect the fundamental rights and interests of its people, but
also tend within its borders to create instability, invite terror-
ist activities, generate breach of peace, enlarge differences
between ethnic, cultural, religious and political groups, encour-
age extremist sub-nationalism, promote secessionist move-
ments, and result in civil war and human atrocities.
It is obvious, but often neglected, that we are living in a
community of equal members which is sometimes said to be a
"state of nature." °4 There does not exist a general suprana-
tional legislature, nor a world government, nor a world police
force, nor a body of "world law," despite increasingly clamorous
academic and non-academic grandiloquence aimed at softening
or derogating national sovereignty and replacing international
law with a "supranational" law. The creation, maintenance,
perfection and effectiveness of the existing international legal
system rely on the sovereign wills and compromises of nation-
States as the key actors. International human rights law is no
exception. Unless and until nation-States have submitted by
consent to international arrangements, human rights protec-
tions are essentially a matter of domestic law and domestic
jurisdiction. Even where international human rights regimes
exist due to States' agreements, such regimes can be best en-
forced by the States themselves rather than through external
or international implementation mechanisms. The 1981 Decla-
ration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention makes this clear
by providing that States have "[t]he right and duty... to ob-
serve, promote and defend all human rights and fundamental
freedoms within their own national territories and to work
[towards] the elimination of massive and flagrant violations of
the rights of nations and peoples, and in particular, for the
elimination of apartheid and all forms of racism and racial
discrimination." °5 The same instrument also reaffirms the
duty of States to refrain from exploiting and distorting human
rights as an instrument of "interference in the internal affairs
of States, of exerting pressure on other States or creating dis-
trust and disorder within and among States or groups of
104. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269-71 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
105. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 41, at para.
2(III)(c).
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States.'06
The proliferation of international human rights instru-
ments and enforcement regimes by no means envisages the
end or near-disappearance of nation-States. The realpolitik of
the international system remains to be founded upon the com-
promise and cooperation of individual sovereign nations. State
sovereignty and its corollaries are still the most important and
most fundamental principles of international law. The fact that
States have agreed to establish certain international human
rights regimes does not avail itself to be construed as diminish-
ing the sovereign rights of States that have given their consent
or compromise. According to Vattel, States do not abandon
their sovereignty by agreeing to their subjection to internation-
al law.07 While Vattel must have been referring to perempto-
ry norms of natural law, the principle still holds true whether
one views international law as a set of positive or natural
norms. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in S.S.
Wimbledon, declined to hold that a State, in concluding a trea-
ty by which it undertakes to perform or refrain from perform-
ing a particular act, abandons its sovereignty, since "the right
of entering into international engagements is an attribute of
State sovereignty.""0 8  The principle recognized by the
Wimbledon court would also apply to States' voluntary and
involuntary (compromised) subjection to the rules of customary
international law in general and of international jus cogens
norms in particular. The late Judge Schwarzenberger was
correct in writing that,
doctrinal attempts at spiriting away sovereignty must remain
meaningless. Actually, such efforts appear to minimise undu-
ly the fundamental character of the principle of legal sover-
eignty within the realm of international law. The rules un-
derlying this principle derive their importance from the basic
fact that "almost all international relations are bound up"
with the independence of States. Thus, the principle of sover-
eignty in general, and that of territorial sovereignty in partic-
ular, remains of necessity the "point of departure" in settling
most questions that concern international relations. 9
106. Id. at para. 2(II)(1).
107. VATrEL, supra note 18, at 2.
108. See S.S. "Wimbledon", 1923 P.CI.J. (Ser. A) No. 1, at 25.
109. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (3rd ed., 1957).
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There are, and must be, ways to harmonize national sover-
eignty and individual rights. The 1975 Helsinki Declaration
stressed the respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and equal rights and self-determination of peoples. °10
At the same time, it also attached at least equal importance to
the principles of State sovereignty, non-intervention, non-use
of force, and territorial integrity."' All of these principles
were of "primary significance," and would be "equally and
unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking
into account the others.""2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former
Secretary-General of the UN, stated that although "[tihe time
of absolute and exclusive sovereignty. . . has passed," the
"foundation-stone" of the work to achieve international security
"is and must remain the State," and "respect for [the State's]
fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any com-
mon international progress.""' As long as we continue to re-
gard the principle of State sovereignty as the "foundation stone
of international law - the rule of the independence of
states,""4 the alleged conflicts between sovereign rights and
human rights would not be difficult to solve.
Simply put, States have the general desire and willingness
to protect their citizens' rights and interests and to cooperate
among themselves to achieve greater protection on the interna-
tional plane. In that sense, national sovereignty and indepen-
dence, in general terms, serve more as a guarantee of, than a
hurdle to, the realization of basic human rights. Where con-
flicts do exist, we cannot simplistically conclude that individual
human rights are higher than national sovereign rights, since
human rights are not absolute, and as such are dependent on
the willingness, power and cooperation of the nation-States for
their recognition, enforcement and perfection. Nor can we sim-
plistically maintain a State, because of its national sovereign-
ty, can ignore the obligations it has undertaken under positive
international law in the area of human rights. A State's na-
tional sovereignty would ordinarily take precedence, for human
110. See Helsinki Declaration, supra note 31, at Principles VII & VIII.
111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
112. 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1296 (1975).
113. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary General to the Security
Council (1992) (on file with author).
114. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 12.
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rights issues are primarily a matter of domestic law and do-
mestic jurisdiction. Yet, to the extent human rights issues have
entered the domain of positive international customary and
conventional law following States' consent and compromise,
they are no longer exclusively domestic concerns.
Accordingly, Nation-States need to maintain a balance be-
tween national sovereignty and individual rights when they
are in conflict. Certainly, a State which, by exercising its sov-
ereign power, has consented to an international or regional
human rights regime may not use its national sovereignty as a
shield to evade or violate its international obligations to re-
frain from massive and systematic human rights abuses. Fail-
ure to observe such obligations would entail international
responsibility, including international criminal liability for
which the violator would be made answerable in an orderly
and civilized manner. By the same token, no State or other
actor may exploit or abuse human rights issues as an excuse to
undermine the national sovereignty of another, interfere in its
domestic affairs, and violate its political independence and
territorial integrity. International responses to, including per-
missible institutionalized interventions in, alleged or possible
human rights violations must be in strict conformity with trea-
ty regimes and other positive law.
V. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO GO?
That all individuals under positive international and na-
tional law deserve certain basic human rights is beyond doubt.
Promoting respect for, and protection of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms is one of the purposes of the United
Nations and may have become a fundamental principle of
international law despite disagreements with regard to the
content and extent of individual rights. Much more fundamen-
tal, however, is the constitutive principle that States that cre-
ate international law are sovereign, having the inherent right
of political independence and territorial integrity, and more
particularly, the right to manage its domestic affairs free from
external interference. It is through the operation of this funda-
mental principle that the international community has largely
maintained and enhanced peace and security of States by pro-
moting their general interests in keeping the status quo
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against not only external subjugation and interference, but
also against internal disturbances having the potential to dis-
member the State and leading to greater human rights viola-
tions. It is true that national sovereignty is not absolute,"'
but it is equally true that "human rights" are not unrestricted
either. A State's sovereignty is certainly subject to its interna-
tional obligations to respect and protect human rights under
treaties and custom; the breach of which will incur liability not
simply to the victims but also other members of the interna-
tional community. On the other hand, existing positive lex lata
does not go so far as to allow a State or a group of States to
employ human rights as a tool to disregard the national sover-
eignty of another State and intervene in its domestic affairs.
After all, the international system remains essentially a collec-
tion of nation-States with fixed borders within which they
expect freedom from external interference.
The remaining questions relate to the trend of developing
international law. As we enter the 21st century, should we
espouse major changes to existing lex lata? How much? In
what direction? By and through whom? Should the internation-
al community work toward further limiting or even relinquish-
ing national sovereignty by, for example, allowing interven-
tions in the name of protecting individual rights? Is it ready or
will it be ready to replace the nation-States with a "world
government" in the new centennial?
In a new century of further globalization, integration and
interdependence, the concepts of nation-States and sovereignty
will almost certainly face greater tests and challenges. Some
have characterized the proliferation of international law norms
and public international organizations in the latter part of the
20th century as a trend toward "multilateralization," and even
conjectured that this alleged trend "has so fundamentally
transformed the character of international law that even the
term 'international law' is an anachronism.""' However, it
is doubtful nation-States will ever be ready in a considerable
115. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 6 (stating that intervention, as a rule, is for-
bidden by international law, albeit with exceptions). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 3,
para. 7.
116. John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward Multilateral
Solutions Is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
605, 606 (1994).
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.period of time to dissolve themselves and reform into, or sub-
ject themselves to, a world government. National identity and
national interests will continue to matter. Existing cultural,
ethnic, religious, philosophical and other differences between
nation-States are such that they will not easily die off. Recent
decades have seen not only the willingness of certain States to
compromise part of their national identity and sovereignty in
exchange for greater benefits for their nations, but also the
tendency toward proliferation of more States and the rising of
neo-nationalism. The principles of State sovereignty, political
independence, territorial integrity, non-interference and non-
use of force are as clear and essential as 1 + 1 = 2. These prin-
ciples unequivocally set boundaries limiting interventions,
territorial ambitions and the use of force, thus requiring few
vague value judgments in the determination of illegalities.
Nation-States have largely benefited from these principles and
would have no rational basis for discarding such principles and
for denying their own identity and existence in the 21st cen-
tury. If we ever need to change or modify the edifice of interna-
tional law at all, its foundation stones should be the last to
alter.
Meanwhile, it is also important to realize that internation-
al law has never been static. In that sense, we are certain that
it is going to experience changes, including major changes, in
the 21st century. States are willing and ready to work together
toward finding new solutions to new problems. The changes
will include not only additions to, but also modifications and
reforms of, existing law. "The existing international legal sys-
tem.., contains many unjust and unfair elements and institu-
tions that certainly need to be improved and reformed towards
greater fairness, justice, equality and democracy for the inter-
ests of the entire international community, especially third
world States and their people.""7 These desired changes or
lex ferenda can be brought about by the formation by States of
new rules in the forms of treaties and/or customs. Since trea-
ties do not bind upon third parties, any major change to exist-
ing law by treaty provisions would require the explicit consent
of States. Amending the Charter of the United Nations would
be especially uneasy given the procedural complexity and the
117. Shen, Intervention, supra note 3, at Conclusion.
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veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council.
However, changes may be "sneaked" into existing positive law
by way of custom - even before we realize them.
The formation of rules of customary international law
depends on two elements: (1) the general practice of States and
(2) their general opinio juris. If some States (especially those
with more influential power) uninterruptedly adopt a certain
practice on a given issue, other States may be drawn to follow
suit. The more States to follow, the more likely these practices
may become binding customary rules. The main factor that
upgrades a practice into a customary rule with binding force is
the opinio juris of States. A given practice will gradually be-
come a principle of customary international law - at least
among those States that believe such practice has already
attained legally binding force. It does not have to take every
State to put to use a given practice and to give its opinio juris
in order to make the practice a custom. So long as those States
that have not followed the practice do not resort to a different
and conflicting practice, the element of "general State practice"
would be deemed satisfied. And as long as these non-active
States have raised no objections to the practice in question, or
have acquiesced to it within a considerable period of time, the
element of opinio juris would be deemed met, and the practice
would become a customary rule with binding force. This is
where we may see hope for sound international rule of law and
human rights protections; it is also where the greatest danger
exists.
The hope is that States - particularly developing States -
may act in coordination and concert to actively participate in
the formation of fairer, more just and more progressive prac-
tices and norms, including those in the field of human rights,
and prevent the creation of unfair, unjust and retroactive prac-
tice and norms. The danger lies in that there may, not neces-
sarily will, emerge some customary norms, such as one that
would legalize armed intervention without the Security
Council's authorization. These would be detrimental to the
long term interests of States at large, and in particular, of
small and weak nations. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is
one example. In justifying the bombing, except for some degree
of deviations in Greece, Italy and perhaps France, there ap-
peared to be a consensus among NATO States, the total num-
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ber of which - currently 19 - is by no means insignificant."'
These States are generally rich, powerful and influential.
Countries which are not NATO members might either share
the same tradition, culture, custom and interests as NATO
States, or might be in need of aid from, or in fear of, NATO
countries. These countries might be unwilling, or dare not, to
go publicly against NATO for violating positive international
law and the Charter of the United Nations. They might even
openly stand on NATO's side. The more States that approved
or supported the NATO bombing or gave acquiescence to the
action, the more likely that NATO's attempt to change interna-
tional law in NATO's favor would succeed. The less States that
openly opposed and protested against NATO's action, the less
likely for the international community to maintain and pre-
serve existing fundamental principles of international law on
State sovereignty, non-intervention and prohibition of use of
force in the new century. In time, it would become legal for
NATO and other powers to intervene in the internal affairs of
other States and to use force at their will. On the contrary, the
more States to oppose and protest against unauthorized inter-
vention and use of force and the less States to go along with
NATO's move, the less chance of success for there to emerge a
customary norm legalizing unilateral intervention and use of
force.
While States should recognize the need to find better ways
to cure many humanitarian problems they face, this cannot be
accomplished at the total expense of national dignity and sov-
ereignty. Changing the contents of international law regarding
State sovereignty and its corollaries is certainly not in the
interests of the international community at large; especially of
third world countries. Preserving and respecting the national
sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of
States can, on balance, more effectively reduce and eliminate
the root causes to a great portion of atrocities and other hu-
manitarian disasters. To a certain extent, the principle of State
sovereignty should be strengthened instead of further weak-
ened in the era to come. It is, therefore, of paramount impor-
118. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (estab-
lishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [hereinafter NATO]). See also
NATO: The 19 Member Countries, at http://www.nato.intlstructur/countries.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2000).
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tance that States at large, especially third world States, for
their own individual and collective interests as well as for
world peace and stability, be at high alert against any attempt
to divert the course of international law in this regard. They
should make an unremitting effort to firmly and openly con-
demn any disregard of the principle of State sovereignty, reject
any non-institutionalized intervention and interference, oppose
any unilateral use or threat of force, and resolutely resist any
attempt to legalize the illegality of such behavior. At the same
time, it also might be in the interests of States at large to
consider reforming the United Nations and amending its Char-
ter by allowing the General Assembly, when the Security
Council is unable to fulfil its functions, to adopt or authorize
enforcement measures by a two-thirds majority vote in order to
deter, prevent and respond to genuine massive and systematic
human rights violations within or across borders that require
international action. 119
To conclude, neither sovereignty negates human rights,
nor vice-versa. Potential conflicts between national sovereignty
and individual rights best can be solved in accordance with
positive international law. The fact that nation-States and
their sovereignty (albeit restricted) function as the foundation
stone of the international legal system, and the fact that it is
unrealistic to get rid of the nation-State system in any foresee-
able future, make it nothing but utopian to substitute the
nation-State system with a global government. States will not
be ready in the foreseeable future to completely surrender
their sovereign rights. Any change to and reform of the exist-
ing international legal system still must be premised upon the
consent and compromise of nation-States. Such change and
reform, desirably in a fairer, more just, more orderly and more
democratic direction, can be ultimately realized only by and
through nation-States as the decisive actors for their own and
common interests, as well as for the welfare of their people.
119. By emphasizing the word "genuine," I intend to distinguish between mas-
sive, purposeful and systematic violations of a State's obligations under interna-
tional human rights law from State actions in combating terrorists, separatists and
criminals that may sometimes inevitably involve human sufferings or even unin-
tentional and incidental departure from human rights obligations. Generally speak-
ing, the former categories of violations would be appropriate for international ac-
tions, while the latter generally would not.
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